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while maintaining performance. One of the elements examined by the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency was the idea of fractionating a current monolithic satellite 
system into several smaller, space-based group (SBG) satellites. This architecture would 
allow for multiple, smaller, and less expensive satellites to work together to accomplish 
the several missions. 
This study focused on research and analysis of the system FireSat. The analysis 
removed the ground communications suite from the sensor platform. A Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet was used to develop the resulting cost relation for the sensor-only satellite. 
Using assumptions provided by that analysis, three additional systems, currently in 
operation, were examined for cost savings if placed into the SBG. The Tracking and Data 
Relay Satellite was used as a basis for cost of a communications satellite. The cost 
analysis resulted in an estimated $52 million FY15 to the space segments alone. 
Additional research is required to determine cost savings within the full architecture and 
develop a risk-cost analysis to determine whether cost could be further reduced due to 
higher reliability, lower replacement cost risk, and longer lifetimes. 
vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................2 
B. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION ..................................................3 
C. BENEFITS OF STUDY ...................................................................................3 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ..................................................................4 
II. SPACE-BASED GROUP COMPARISON................................................................5 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................5 
B. MONOLITHIC ARCHITECTURE...............................................................6 
1. Concept Inception ................................................................................6 
2. Design and Development .....................................................................6 
a. Multi-mission Design ................................................................7 
b. Technological Limitations ........................................................8 
c. Reliability Development ..........................................................10 
3. Test and Employment ........................................................................11 
a. Payload Integration.................................................................11 
b. Demand Requirements ............................................................12 
c. On-Orbit Operations ...............................................................12 
C. UTILIZATION OF SPACE BASED GROUPS ..........................................14 
1. Development .......................................................................................14 
2. Overall Integration ............................................................................15 
3. On-Orbit Maintainability ..................................................................16 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................17 
III. RESEARCH ANALYSIS ..........................................................................................19 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................19 
B. MISSION REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................19 
C. FRACTIONAL DIVISION ...........................................................................21 
1. Orbital Modeling ................................................................................21 
2. Sensor Selection ..................................................................................24 
3. Operation and Support......................................................................26 
a. Initial Operation Capability ....................................................26 
b. Operation and Reliability ........................................................27 
c. Repairability ............................................................................28 
4. Launch Segment .................................................................................29 
5. System Communications ...................................................................31 
a. Space-Based Communications ...............................................31 
b. Ground Communications .......................................................34 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................35 
IV. APPLICATION OF STUDY ....................................................................................37 
A. ANALYSIS SUMMARY ...............................................................................37 
viii 
B. COST COMPARISONS ................................................................................38 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................40 
V. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................41 
A. KEY POINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................................41 
B. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ..........................................................42 
APPENDIX:  FIRESAT SBG SENSOR DESIGN ..............................................................43 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................51 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Basic System Acquisition Framework (from Defense Acquisition Portal, 
2013) ..................................................................................................................5 
Figure 2. DOD versus Space Life Cycle Cost Curve (from Department of Defense 
Space Acquisition, 2014) .................................................................................13 
Figure 3. FireSat 2D Model from STK v. 10 ..................................................................23 
Figure 4. FireSat Observation of Wildfire Area from STK v. 10 ...................................23 
Figure 5. FireSat Communication Access to NOAA Ground Stations from  STK v. 
10......................................................................................................................24 
Figure 6. Pegasus  XL without Hydrazine Auxiliary Propulsion System Performance 
Capability (from Pegasus  User’s Guide, 2007, p. 11). ...................................30 
Figure 7. Orbital Inputs ...................................................................................................43 
Figure 8. Optics Payload Information .............................................................................44 
Figure 9. Payload Physical Sizing ...................................................................................45 
Figure 10. Uplink Communications Inputs .......................................................................46 
Figure 11. Downlink Communications Input ....................................................................47 
Figure 12. Final Design Sizing Input ................................................................................48 
Figure 13. Cost Estimate Inputs ........................................................................................49 
Figure 14. Space Segment Cost Comparison ....................................................................50 
x 
 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. NASA Technology Readiness Level Chart (from Mankins, 1995) ...................9 
Table 2. FireSat Top-Level Mission Requirements (from Apgar et al., 1999, p. 16) ....20 
Table 3. Sensor Design Parameters (from Apgar et al., 1999, pp. 293–297) ................25 
Table 4. System Example Parameters (from Bell, 2014) ...............................................38 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
COCOM  Combatant Commander 
CONUS  Continental United States 
DARPA  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DOD  Department of Defense 
F6 Future, Fast, Flexible, Fractionated Free-flying Spacecraft 
United by Information Exchange System 
FGST Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescope 
FY Fiscal Year 
GALEX Galaxy Evolution Explorer 
GEO  Geostationary Earth Orbit 
ISS  International Space Station 
LAN  Local Area Network 
LEO Low Earth Orbit 
MANASSAS Mission-Aware Network Architecture for Small-Satellite 
Adaptive Systems 
MUOS  Mobile User Objective Systems 
MWNE  Mir Wireless Network Experiment 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NAVAIR  Naval Aviation 
NOAA  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
RAAN  Right Ascension of the Ascending Node 
R&D  Research and Development 
SATCOM  Satellite Communications 
SBG  Space-based Group 
SMAD  Space Mission Analysis and Design 
SSCM  Small Satellite Cost Management 
STK  System Tool Kit 
STS Space Transportation System 
SWIFT Swift Gamma Ray Burst Explorer 
xiv 
TDRS  Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
TRL  Technology Readiness Level 
TT&C  Telemetry, Tracking, and Control 
UFO  UHF Follow-On  
xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank Professors Charles Racoosin and William Welch for 
patience and guidance during the process of completing this thesis. Your understanding 
and direction for this thesis kept me on task. I would also like to thank CAPT Daniel 
Schebler, CDR Jeffery Mullen, and LCDR Zeke Poiro, who supported me in my 
dedication to earning this degree. 
I cannot show enough appreciation to my wife, Desireé, for her patience, 
perseverance, and motivation during my completion of this thesis. Her dedication and the 
understanding of my children, James and Myra, allowed me to achieve this master’s 
degree, with this thesis as the concluding product, and I am forever grateful.  
xvi 




Since the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957, the nations of the world have researched 
and designed spacecraft to perform a variety of services while in orbit. These missions 
range from weather monitoring to worldwide communications. Technology has advanced 
rapidly in the past half-century, and this has led to increased requirements placed upon 
orbital systems. These requirements have resulted in a transition from a singular mission 
based system into a platform capable of facets of different missions, all executed 
concurrently. These coupled requirements have given rise to an increase in complexities, 
increasing the need to reduce failures, resulting in increased costs. The continued focus 
on a requirement-centric at minimum-cost paradigm has endured due to the U.S. military, 
the “aerospace industry’s star client” according to Brown and Eremenko (2006b, p. 3) 
The focus of military application of space systems has maintained a requirement 
based acquisition architecture to fulfill Combatant Commander (COCOM) and national 
strategic desires in the field. The continuous battle has been the cost of these systems, and 
specifically the best way to reduce the lifetime costs while maintaining the desired 
system performance. The draw between utilizing several smaller satellite constellations 
over reduced large, singularly operated satellites continues to be examined by acquisition 
agencies. 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was issued a 
contract to develop a project it termed Future, Fast, Flexible, Fractionated Free-flying 
Spacecraft United by Information Exchange System (F6). This system was developed 
around the basis of fractionated satellites to form a space-based group (SBG) system 
capable replacing the current model of monolithic spacecraft. This development will 
change the concepts of design and development of military satellite systems. The ability 
to relocate, remove, and replace a single system in a cluster is one of the many 
advantages that will improve overall military operations.  
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This thesis compares the architecture of a SBG to that of a system with a similar 
capability that would be representative of a COCOM requirement. It focuses on 
improvements in real-time intelligence and communications; overall cost of a system and 
the incorporation of this architecture into the current military satellite construct. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. military has exploited the freedom of space use for many decades. The 
systems placed in orbit have evolved from those providing basic geolocation to global 
communication to early warning and threat assessment. Each system has been singularly 
developed, focused on meeting national strategic or COCOM requirements. These 
requests for capability requirements are routed through several channels and may often 
result in an ultimate need to develop a new program. The new acquisition program 
typically utilizes current proven technology and a reasonable estimate of maturity of 
future technology. Current acquisition timelines have forced focused system development 
toward a specific payload to meet the requirements, provided by a primary sensor. As 
technology has advanced, the cost of implementation of a single sensor has increased as 
well. This increased cost has driven additions to the lifetime requirements, as a desire to 
ensure reliability and maintainability of a system in order to fully capture the cost return. 
The DARPA System F6 was established in 2006 as a program to develop an 
architecture in which the functions of a monolithic system could be divided into a cluster 
of wirelessly-interconnected smaller satellites, sharing resources to achieve the same 
functions (“System F6,” n.d., para 1). This architecture would display the capability, cost 
analysis, and viability of the SBG for military utilization.  
Recently, the System F6 program has been canceled due to a number of factors, to 
include a lack of an overall integrator for the experiment. The program had awarded 
several small contracts to companies for work distribution; however the lead integrator 
role was not identified (Ferster, 2013). This recent cancelation illustrates a key 
performance requirement of all systems under development, the requirement to integrate 
all components for common use. 
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B. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The increased uncertainty in today’s economy has led to a minimum-cost 
acquisition process adopted by the Department of Defense (DOD). This process, 
combined with the military requirements-centric paradigm, have led architects to 
conclude that the answer is greater capability and increased system lifetime (Saleh, 
2006). These increases have led to multiple requirements being placed upon a system, 
increasing costs of monolithic systems. 
This thesis will examine the benefits of replacing a monolithic satellite system 
with clustered SBG systems, meeting requirements while reducing subsystems and 
complex integration. The paper will utilize the FireSat imaging satellite design provided 
by Space Mission Analysis and Design (SMAD) (Apgar, Bearden, Bell, Berget, Blake, 
Boden, et al., 1999), and model a SBG design, separating the sensor payload from the 
communications suite. The analysis will provide an overall comparison of space segment 
cost of the systems, as well as the benefits and drawbacks of the systems. A final analysis 
will expand the comparison to include other current on orbit systems that could operate in 
conjunction with the SBG. This comparison will attempt to answer the questions: 
• Can the SBG architecture reduce cost of space systems? 
• Could a SBG allow mission flexibility without substantial cost increases? 
C. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
Cost reduction is a highly desired objective in today’s DOD acquisition process. 
Providing equal capabilities, while reducing cost and improving adaptability, will be a 
focus for the long term future of space system utilization. This thesis will examine the 
utilization of SBG architecture within the DOD Space Systems acquisition program, 
determining the benefits of this architecture, and the cost comparison to that of current 
monolithic architectures. 
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D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will focus on a military application of SBG system architecture. The 
example system, FireSat, architecture utilizes an imaging platform for forest fire 
identification and monitoring. The cost analysis focuses on system development, of the 
system, with the primary assumption that the technology utilized was researched and 
developed outside the architecture of the system. An additional assumption is that 
deployment of the systems will be accomplished by current proven means. All cost 
modeling and estimates were done utilizing Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 dollars, based on the 
inflation factors chart, table 20-1, provided in SMAD (Apgar et al., 1999), 
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II. SPACE-BASED GROUP COMPARISON 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The military has become heavily reliant on satellite systems for daily strategic, 
operational, and tactical decisions. The capabilities in place have become requirements, 
and the systems providing these capabilities cannot maintain the growing demand being 
placed on them. Additionally, the rate at which technology matures in today’s economy, 
at times, results in an obsolescent system prior to its initial operational employment. 
Current acquisition models typically result in monolithic architectures to develop and 
deploy new systems to meet the growing demand, and anticipate future demand. The 
acquisition architecture utilized by the DOD requires several milestone periods, which 
could take years for transitions between milestones. Figure 1 illustrates the acquisition 
management the DOD utilizes, and illustrates how the technological development of a 
system is often frozen after a milestone “B” decision. Future developments have to 
proceed through the same process. This acquisition construct does not allow for rapid 
change to a system’s technologic architecture due to obsolescent parts. 
 
Figure 1. Basic System Acquisition Framework (from Defense Acquisition Portal, 
2013) 
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The milestone reviews indicated also allow for program leads to make a 
determination to move toward deployment and operation. These reviews require both 
technological maturity of the system as well as cost performance and estimates to allow 
continuation of the program. 
B. MONOLITHIC ARCHITECTURE 
The structure of monolithic satellite system architectures follow typical 
acquisition models utilized by private and public businesses alike. This section outlines 
this structure from concept to operations, describing some of the characteristics and 
limitations recognized during a satellite system development. 
1. Concept Inception 
A capability requirement is produced by national security strategies, COCOMs, or 
other entities responsible for safe and successful mission completion. These requests for 
capabilities are what drive the initial concept of the satellite system. The system concept 
is refined through multiple requirement characterizations, with a final performance 
requirement being defined prior to milestone “A”. Once the final performance 
requirement is set, an associated payload sensor that can accomplish the mission set 
would be researched and chosen. The associated payload is scrutinized to determine the 
required subsystems needed to fulfil the payload requirements, and an estimated lifetime 
cost is created. The cost of these systems have often increased steadily over time, leading 
architects and managers to come to an inaccurate conclusion that greater capability is 
required to offset the cost growth (Brown & Eremenko, 2006b). This results in additional 
payload requirements and complexities when moving forward into the design and 
development of the system. 
2. Design and Development 
When the primary payload has been defined, the design and development of the 
monolithic system begins. The design phase of a space borne system is a major focus of 
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program management, in that the desire is to provide the best subcomponents for the 
system, while still maintaining a low cost and on time delivery. Achieving a reliable, cost 
effective system becomes the focus of managers, while still remaining under the 
pressures of program and technical uncertainty. These goals often lead to a complex 
spacecraft with multi-mission set requirements, driving costs higher and higher. The 
responses to cost increases have been to maximize the capability versus cost quotient by 
increasing the spacecraft scale and increasing the system lifetime (Saleh 2008). This 
response is does not always allow for appreciated cost savings. 
a. Multi-mission Design 
The ability to fuse a system to provide a range of payloads to satisfy several user 
requirements is an approach that a program management can utilize. This multi-mission 
capability allows for a more secure program during development. However, there are 
several limitations to a multi-mission design, and these limitations can increase as the 
program matures. First, a mission requirement change in a single portion of the system 
during development may require a larger system design change. This design change, in 
turn, results in increased cost and delayed scheduling, and can jeopardize the program. A 
second risk to a multi-mission program is the requirements of each payload or subsystem, 
and negative interactions between them (Owen & Eremenko, 2006a).  
Orndorff and Zink (2010) illustrated this complexity in an example of a 
payload that requires precision pointing and low jitter, but produces a 
large amount of valuable data. Getting the data to the ground requires high 
power, which drives the solar arrays to grow, which in turn disturbs the 
pointing and jitter control capability of the space vehicle. (p. 275) 
 For a multi-mission system, independent development of smaller satellites may 
provide better cost and risk reduction to a program, as compared to the current paradigm 
used in typical architectures. 
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b. Technological Limitations 
A satellite system requires tested technology for employment into the space 
environment. The DOD and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
utilize Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) to systematically measure system and 
subsystem maturity for utilization. The TRLs range from one to nine, from least to most 
mature systems respectively. The example of NASA’s TRLs is illustrated in Table 1. 
These TRLs have huge impacts on the design and development life of a space 
borne system. During design, the payload and subsystems are set based on current mature 
technology, or technology that is expected to reach maturity prior to employment of the 
system. These restrictions require utilization of proven, less advanced technology for 
each sensor and subsystem in a monolithic satellite. In addition, there comes a point 
during the acquisition phase in which a technology freeze must be implemented. This 
forces the development of the current system with no additional changes or upgrades to 
the technology placed within the satellite. This requirement ensures the program stays on 
schedule and reduces programmatic cost that would result from integration and testing of 
newly developed technology. Fixing the design restricts the overall future capability of 
the system in development, freezing the system maturity to a point in time prior to the 
system employment. In order for a capability to be achieved utilizing advanced 
technology, a new system must be developed. The result is a program which continuously 
requires redevelopments to employ newer capabilities to replace the current system, or 
acquiescing on a less advanced technological system to be utilized for the original 




Table 1. NASA Technology Readiness Level Chart (from Mankins, 1995) 
Technology 
Readiness Level Description 
1. Basic principles 
observed and 
reported 
This is the lowest “level” of technology maturation. At this 
level, scientific research begins to be translated into applied 





Once basic physical principles are observed, then at the next 
level of maturation, practical applications of those 
characteristics can be ‘invented’ or identified. At this level, 
the application is still speculative: there is not experimental 
proof or detailed analysis to support the conjecture. 





At this step in the maturation process, active research and 
development (R&D) is initiated. This must include both 
analytical studies to set the technology into an appropriate 
context and laboratory-based studies to physically validate 
that the analytical predictions are correct. These studies and 
experiments should constitute “proof-of-concept” validation 
of the applications/concepts formulated at TRL 2. 





Following successful “proof-of-concept” work, basic 
technological elements must be integrated to establish that 
the “pieces” will work together to achieve concept-enabling 
levels of performance for a component and/or breadboard. 
This validation must be devised to support the concept that 
was formulated earlier, and should also be consistent with the 
requirements of potential system applications. The validation 
is “low-fidelity” compared to the eventual system: it could be 
composed of ad hoc discrete components in a laboratory. 





At this level, the fidelity of the component and/or breadboard 
being tested has to increase significantly. The basic 
technological elements must be integrated with reasonably 
realistic supporting elements so that the total applications 
(component-level, sub-system level or system-level) can be 
tested in a “simulated” or somewhat realistic environment. 
6. System/subsystem 
model or prototype 




A major step in the level of fidelity of the technology 
demonstration follows the completion of TRL 5. At TRL 6, a 
representative model or prototype system or system - which 
would go well beyond ad hoc, “patch-cord” or discrete 
component level breadboarding—would be tested in a 
relevant environment. At this level, if the only “relevant 
environment” is the environment of space, and then the 
model/prototype must be demonstrated in space. 
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Technology 
Readiness Level Description 
7. System prototype 
demonstration in a 
space environment 
TRL 7 is a significant step beyond TRL 6, requiring an actual 
system prototype demonstration in a space environment. The 
prototype should be near or at the scale of the planned 
operational system and the demonstration must take place in 
space. 
8. Actual system 
completed and 
“flight qualified” 
through test and 
demonstration 
(ground or space) 
In almost all cases, this level is the end of true “system 
development” for most technology elements. This might 
include integration of new technology into an existing 
system. 




In almost all cases, the end of last “bug fixing” aspects of 
true “system development.” This might include integration of 
new technology into an existing system. This TRL does not 
include planned product improvement of ongoing or reusable 
systems. 
 
c. Reliability Development 
Once a system has been designed and development is underway, a focused desire 
is to incorporate reliability and fragility for reduced mission degradation or failures as a 
result of any system damage. Fragility, as defined by Brown and Eremenko (2006a) “is 
the tendency of complex systems to exhibit unmodeled failure modes, usually due to an 
unanticipated component interaction leading to a catastrophic, albeit improbable, 
sequence of events” (p. 2). Reliability is the tendency of the system to be trusted to 
perform as designed, and to provide the data as required by the customer. The 
developmental requirements to attain reliability and flexibility necessitate continued 
examination of essential parts of the system during development. Every subsystem 
required to provide support to the payload must be scrutinized, ensuring that margins or 
additional redundant components are incorporated in order to provide a reliable system 
(Brown & Eremenko, 2006a). 
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The additions to a system to ensure reliability are not enough to protect against 
failure of employment and operation of the spacecraft. Several factors can occur that 
would result in a loss in the capability that the system is due to provide, such as launch 
vehicle failure, damage during launch, in-space collision, etc. These additional failures 
require contingencies in order to ensure capabilities are not lost. Commercial companies 
require additional insurance to cover these costs, such as 10 percent to 20 percent of the 
payload replacement cost for launch failure, and an annual two percent to five percent on-
orbit insurance (“Commercial space,” 2002). For the DOD, the missions often require an 
expensive replacement in the event of a failure during employment, even though they are 
technically self-insured (Brown & Eremenko, 2006b). 
3. Test and Employment 
Once a system has completed milestone B, it proceeds to test and evaluation, 
while continued development of the system is completed. The parallel test and 
development allows for contractors to improve systems prior to full implementation and 
integration. 
a. Payload Integration 
Great design and detail are required for payload integration of a monolithic 
satellite system. A singular satellite must ensure common communication between the 
payload, the power subsystems, the data storage devices, and the communication suite. 
This focused integration within a single system results in a single contractor, responsible 
for the development of all the systems, ensuring proper integration. Combine this with a 
multiple mission system, and the coupled interfaces increase the development risk, which 
in turn requires combinatorial complexity during testing (Orndorff & Zink, 2010). 
Integration is a discipline that requires complex interaction between the monolithic 
system itself, as well as the ground segments which receive from and transmit to the 
system.  
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b. Demand Requirements 
During payload integration and system development, the required performance 
demand for a system must be determined. This determination must be made for a future 
date, due to increases in development, manufacturing, and launch windows (Brown & 
Eremenko, 2006a). The system must be able to meet these demands, which often involve 
the quality, availability, and repeatability of the products provided. Added into this 
demand is an estimated increase in customers once operational. An ideal example of 
added customers is that of military satellite communications (SATCOM). Developed 
initially for naval vessels at sea, the requirement has spread to all military units; at sea, 
ashore, desert, or jungle. The result has been the development of the Mobile User 
Objective System (MUOS) to replace the current UHF follow-on SATCOM system. The 
MUOS will increase SATCOM accessibility in theater (Bandil, Pandya, & Shields, 
2010). 
A monolithic system cost can increase exponentially when attempting to meet all 
of the requirements that would expanded its capability. Frequently, trade-offs must occur 
to reach cost goals while sacrificing requirements. For example, program developers will 
trade the amount of data a payload can provide with the bandwidth used to transmit that 
data down to a ground station (Orndorff & Zink, 2010). This type of trade-off results in a 
system that does not fully meet the intent of the request for capability; and is an inherent 
problem with a single, monolithic system. 
c. On-Orbit Operations 
Once a monolithic system is placed into orbit, the product provided is highly 
scrutinized by the customer that receives it. Once fully operational, the quality of data 
provided will also affect the demand placed on the system, and the combined result of the 
system to meet the demand and the product will feed into the cost allotted for maintaining 
and operating the system. This cost could result in continued operation past the initial 
date, or could cause the DOD to remove funding and kill the project before the intended 
lifetime has been reached. The volatility of military funding and national economics 
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require a quick and accurate assessment of a system’s vitality to the overall mission it has 
been developed to support. The operation and maintenance of a space system, conversely 
to that of other DOD acquisition programs, covers only 30 percent of the total lifetime 
cost of the program, as displayed in Figure 2. If a monolithic satellite has been placed that 
will not meet the requirements set forth during development, the system will be discarded 
and a new development process will begin, resulting in an exuberant cost increase to the 
program. 
 
Figure 2. DOD versus Space Life Cycle Cost Curve (from Department of Defense 
Space Acquisition, 2014) 
When a monolithic system provides quality information, the forced demand on 
that system will increase. This will often lead to delayed products and inaccurate 
assessments of poor performance by the customers. A monolithic system can only 
provide to the expectations of demand that were designed into the system years prior to 
employment. With the advancement of technology, these capabilities are often times 
enormously low as compared to the mid-life demands placed on the system. The only 
response the DOD has to correct for increase demand is to supplement the current 
systems with additional support prior to scheduled replacement with more advanced 
systems. An example of this addition was adding UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellite F11, as 
a gap filler between the UFO communications system and MUOS, which is a next 
generation narrowband communication system (Ghyzel, 2010). 
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C. UTILIZATION OF SPACE BASED GROUPS 
The SBG architecture grants several cost advantages to the current monolithic 
architecture utilized today. The flexibility to contract out pieces of a system during design 
and development can provide cost savings to the DOD, due to competitive pricing on 
individual items, vice a single satellite. Once deployed, SBG systems will reduce 
operation cost, increase the reliability and maintainability of the system, and provide 
quick and relatively cheaper replacement options for customers and contractors alike. The 
savings is focused on how many satellites can perform dissimilar functions within the 
system (Brown & Eremenko, 2006a). Working from this concept, system design and 
development can proceed, with the payloads of each system proceeding parallel to the 
others. 
1. Development 
The development of a SBG system can save schedule cost, contractor cost, and 
allow for future expansion of the system. The ability to award contracts for individual 
modules, developed somewhat independently of each other, allows for competition and 
cost reduction. Each contractor can develop, in parallel, a smaller system that will meet 
the requirements provided, and the subsystems required to support that payload. 
Additionally, since the systems are independent, they do not need to be functionally 
identical (Orndorff & Zink, 2010). The additional integration with the communication 
hub satellite is the only common portion needing development. This requirement is the 
foundation of what binds the acquisition schedule of the system. While delays in the 
communications satellite could result in schedule slippage, the fractionated architecture 
of other components could allow for a steady schedule despite minor delays, allowing 
required milestones to be met on time. 
As stated previously, the uncertainty during development can often lead to 
unanticipated expenses and schedule slippage. When the SBG architecture is used for 
development, additional options are provided that allow for subsequent modifications in 
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the event of unanticipated changes. These options provide real value that can be 
computed into the architecture itself (De Weck et al., 2004). 
2. Overall Integration 
Integration is the key to any system under development in today’s military. 
Integration between systems in a platform, as well as integration between platforms has 
become a continued focus within military leadership.  
Vice Adm. Dunaway, the Naval Aviation (NAVAIR) Commander (2013), 
has stated that NAVAIR is committed to develop the processes, skills, and 
tools to successfully execute mission-level systems-of-systems 
engineering, test and evaluation, and logistics—ensuring all of these 
important elements are as tightly integrated as the capabilities we deliver 
to the Fleet. (p. 4) 
With a SBG structure, the development and fabrication of each module could be 
divided among multiple contractors, but this requires a standardized inter-module 
interface (Brown, 2004). The DARPA F6 project was cancelled by Brad Tousley for 
several reasons, including no overall integrator for the experiment (Ferster, 2013). The 
integration of any system is the key element to the program success, and for SBG, a 
central communication hub satellite that provides the routing and control services is 
required to meet this integration necessity (Orndorff & Zink, 2010).  
The SBG architecture focuses on utilizing the communication hub satellite with 
additional smaller satellites that provide the required capability each was designed for to 
the desired customers. The entire cluster of satellites would utilize a wireless Internet 
Protocol local area network (LAN) to relay information throughout the group. 
Experiments utilizing wireless networks have been used to confirm the capability 
onboard the Mir and International Space Station (Orndorff & Zink, 2010). The success of 
these experiments, in both ensuring data exchange, even at low transmitter power, shows 
that utilization of wireless networks in space is feasible (Lofton, & Conley, 1997). The 
wireless network will allow for each system to provide the required data to the hub 
satellite. This data exchange needs to be robust while allowing for a resistance to 
interferences that are expected to be experienced (Sahel, 2006). Each satellite’s data must 
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also be capable of data transmission through the communication satellite to a ground 
station, or stored in a data storage device onboard the hub satellite. 
Data storage and transmission is the major integration problem in a SBG design. 
The hub satellite must be capable of receiving, and possibly converting, payload data 
required by the customers. This data must also be capable of being compressed, and 
transmitted concurrently with other data from other mission satellites. The integration 
should be granted to the hub satellite contract, ensuring that the central network satellite 
can perform the mission of integrating all the data into a usable and transmittable form. 
3. On-Orbit Maintainability 
A separate issue that can arise for any system in orbit is the requirement to fix or 
replace the system due to mechanical malfunction or damage due to launch or space-
borne hazards. The standard procedure for a malfunctioning system is to either utilize it 
under degraded conditions or decommission it and employ a replacement. A small 
fraction of satellite that have malfunctioned have been repaired, however that avenue is 
expensive, limited to low earth orbit systems, and unfeasible in today’s environment 
without a manned space vehicle capable of providing that type of access for mechanical 
work. 
A SBG system, by virtue of each component of the system being fractionated, 
allow for flexibility in the event of different uncertainties, such as technical failures and 
component obsolescence (De Weck, De Nuefville, & Chaize 2004). A malfunctioning 
component can be replaced at cost of the single component plus launch. This can also be 
completed for system components that have become obsolete, or for a technology that has 
been matured that would dramatically improve the performance of the SBG system. The 
entire system would not need to be replaced for improvements; additional components 
need only join the network for the enhancements to be realized.   
Additionally, a SBG system could be designed with an on-orbit servicing 
component, a satellite capable of performing minor repairs required during the lifetime of 
the system. These servicing satellites would be employed in large SBG clusters where 
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quick replacement would not be feasible, such as in geosynchronous orbit; or a situation 
where failure of a major component could not be tolerated, such as the communications 
satellite of a high demand system. Orndorff and Zink state “fully autonomous servicing 
has been proven on orbit with the DARPA Orbital Express mission. Orbital Express 
successfully demonstrated autonomous rendezvous, cooperative and uncooperative 
docking, fuel transfer, and replacement of individual packaged components” (2010, p. 
277). The design would need to be defined as an initial capability during development, 
but could be built to reduce overall lifetime cost. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This previous chapter has developed an architecture comparison of the current 
monolithic systems and that of a SBG fractionated system. The current paradigm that the 
military utilizes to fulfil requirements is flawed and has resulted in requiring greater 
capabilities on a system in order to answer cost growth, which has had the effect of 
increasing those costs (Brown & Eremenko 2006b). The desire is to provide a 
replacement for these traditional, large monolithic satellites with a SBG of satellites, 
which would fly in a wirelessly linked network (Orndorff & Zink, 2010). This 
architecture would allow for parallel development of components, transition to 
integration of a system-of-systems, and a capability to repair or replace a component 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 19 
III. RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will utilize the FireSat example architecture found in SMAD and a 
fractionated breakdown of the sensor will be analyzed for cost comparison. FireSat’s 
architecture was defined by the requirement for an imaging platform to conduct forest 
fire detection and monitoring. This chapter will present these requirements and the 
process in which a suitable payload system was developed. The chapter will also examine 
the comparison between the communication requirements of FireSat and those required 
of a SBG, with the expectation of growth of the requirements of the constellation. 
B. MISSION REQUIREMENTS 
The first emphasis of any system is to define the overarching program objectives. 
The objectives are the strategic mission goals that the customer provides to the 
government, contractor, or other developmental units. With the environment of today, 
primary objectives and secondary objectives are often times developed to allow for multi-
purpose or multi-functional systems. The FireSat program was given the following 
objectives, found in figure 1-4 in SMAD (from Apgar et al., 1999, p. 13). The primary 
objective was “to detect, identify, and monitor forest fires throughout the United States, 
including Alaska and Hawaii, in near real time” (from Apgar et al., 1999, p. 13) 
Additional secondary objectives were: 
• To demonstrate to the public that positive action is underway to contain 
forest fires. 
• To collect statistical data on the outbreak and growth of forest fires. 
• To monitor forest fires for other countries. 
• To collect other forest management data. 
These objectives allowed for focused allotment of resources by the developmental 
teams, while still allowing free design to accomplish the desired goal. The objectives of a 
program are translated into high level mission requirements, which drive the specific 
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architecture development for a system. The requirements provide specific, measurable 
performance specifications that the system is required to meet. Table 2 provides the top-
level requirements that are derived for FireSat. 
The FireSat requirements drive several aspects of the system, including orbit, 
sensor, and selection, payload operation and support, and launch. The following sections 
break apart these sections, as provided by SMAD, to fractionated type architecture. A 
focus of the research is based on the idea that each SBG satellite focuses on a single 
mission element, therefore simplifying engineering and integration efforts (Orndorff & 
Zink, 2010). 




4 temperature levels 
30 m resolution 
500 m location accuracy 
Coverage Daily coverage of 750 million acres within Continental United States (CONUS) 
Responsiveness 
Send registered mission data within 30 min to 
up to 50 users 
Secondary Mission 4 temperature levels for pest management 
Operational 
Duration Mission operational at least 10 years 
Availability 
98 percent excluding weather 
3-day maximum outage 
Survivability Natural environment only 
Data Distribution 
Up to 500 fire-monitoring offices 
+2,000 rangers worldwide (maximum of 100 
simultaneous users) 
Data Content, Form, & Format 
Location and extent of fire on any of 12 map 




Cost Less than $20M/year plus research and development 
Schedule 
Initial operating capability within 5 years, 
final operating capability within 6 years 
Regulations NASA mission 
Political Responsive to public demand for action 
Environment Natural 
Interfaces 
Communication relay and interoperable 
through NOAA ground stations 
Developmental 
Launch on Space Transportation System 
(STS) or expendable 
No unique operations people at data 
distribution nodes 
C. FRACTIONAL DIVISION 
A fractional system provides the ability to diversify the system between different 
components and functions. The following paragraphs detail the breakdown of FireSat, as 
a monolithic system, to a SBG of a single optical sensor system. 
1. Orbital Modeling 
The initial mission element required to develop an effective space system is to 
determine where in space it will be designed to operate. The orbital modeling drives the 
payload and subsystem capabilities to achieve the mission. Selection of an orbit is often a 
compromise of the ability to perform to perfect specifications, and the least costs options 
of a specific payload desired. During analysis of alternatives, a specific payload 
capability may restrict the orbital parameters in which the system can operate. 
Additionally, subsystem capabilities or launch limitations will dictate some of the orbital 
parameters. This analysis must be done early and often during acquisition of a system, as 
slight details could impact the system’s capability to meet the requirements due to orbital 
placement. The orbit design required focuses on meeting the objectives of the FireSat 
program, specifically revisit time of a specific area for surveillance or communications.  
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The objective of FireSat was to be able to detect, identify, and monitor forest fires 
in real time; as well as provide some additional tasks, to include public reassurance of 
current forest fire containment. This drives a requirement of daily coverage within 
CONUS, with no more than three days of outage for availability, with an objective of 
including Hawaii, Alaska, and other regions. The ideal orbital position to provide real-
time, continuous coverage would be a geostationary earth orbit (GEO). This would allow 
for 100 percent coverage of the continental United States, but would not allow a single 
satellite to provide coverage of Alaska and Hawaii. The cost increase for a payload and 
subsystem capable of providing the data also increases, as well as requirements in 
reaching GEO. Recent accounts of government acquisition programs utilizing 
conventional GEO systems have had negative results on cost, schedule, and performance 
(Orndorff & Zink, 2010). 
Utilizing the requirements provided, the ideal orbit to satisfy the program needs 
was a circular orbit near 700 km with an inclination that provides the access times to 
CONUS. The design point utilizes an inclination of 55 deg at this altitude, and to utilize 
two systems with a Right Ascension of the Ascending Node (RAAN) offset of 120 deg 
(Apgar et al., 1999). The cost analysis completed only focused on a single system at 
RAAN of 0 deg, using the assumption the additional system offset provides the capability 
to fill the multi-hour gaps observed. The program System Tool Kit (STK) was utilized to 
develop an orbital model and to compute access periods for the imaging sensor and 
communication points. The desired communication ground stations utilized were the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) stations located in Alaska 
and Maryland. The inputs for orbital information, area of interest, ground stations, 
sensors, and communication systems are provided in Table 2. Figure 3 provides a 2D 
view of the area of interest, the FireSat ground trace for a single orbit, and the ground 
station locations that were be utilized. Access times to the area of interest and ground 
stations are illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively. The assumption was made 
that a FireSat SBG has an identical orbits and imaging sensor. As displayed in Figure 5, a 
single sensor would have daily access to either ground station. 
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Figure 3. FireSat 2D Model from STK v. 10 
 
Figure 4. FireSat Observation of Wildfire Area from STK v. 10 
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Figure 5. FireSat Communication Access to NOAA Ground Stations from  
STK v. 10 
2. Sensor Selection 
An observation and alert platform, such as FireSat, requires an optical sensor 
capable of not only monitoring large area fires, but detection of small fires to allow for 
early response for prevention of large area damage. This optic requires high fidelity to 
perform this detection, and an ability to perform day or night detection. This initial 
requirement leads to utilization of a passive Infrared optic. 
To develop a preliminary understanding of the optic, it is required to step through 
design process, as provided in SMAD pages 293 through 297. Table 3 outlines the 
calculated results based on the requirements of 30 m resolution and selection of a  





Table 3. Sensor Design Parameters (from Apgar et al., 1999, pp. 293–297) 
Parameter Value 
Orbital Altitude 700 km 
Orbit Period 98.8 min 
Ground Track Velocity 6.76 km/s 
Node Shift 24.8 deg 
Earth angular radius 64.3 deg 
Max. Horizontal Distance 3069 km 
Max. Incidence Angle 70 deg 
Nadir Angle 57.9 deg 
Min. Elevation Angle 20 deg 
Earth Central Angle 12.1 deg 
Slant Range 1578 km 
Swath Width 24.2 deg 
Max. Ground Sampling Distance along track 68 m 
Instantaneous field of view 0.00245 deg 
Max cross-track pixel resolution at ECAmax 199.6 m 
Cross-track ground pixel resolution at nadir 90 m 
Along-track pixel resolution and nadir 90 m 
Number of cross-track pixels 4.70E+04   
Number of swaths recorded along-track in 1 
second 
225.6   
Number of pixels recorded in 1 second 1.06E+07   
Number of bits used for each pixel 8 bits 
Data rate 85 Mbps 
Number of pixels for whiskbroom Inst. 256   
Pixel integration period 24.1 μs 
Pixel read-out frequency 42 kHz 
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This information is the basic starting block for the design of the system. This 
information feeds the requirements of the sensor and communications suite. SMAD also 
provides a typical payload characteristics table that can allow for desired payload 
estimates, and is found on page 275 (Apgar et al., 1999). For the given FireSat 
requirements, a Multi-spectral Mid-IR optic was used to compare to the requirements of 
the sensors, with adjustments to the sensor characteristics based on aperture ratio of 0.26. 
This resulted in the following payload size: 
• size: 0.4 m x 0.3 m diameter 
• mass: 28 kg 
• average power at 28 V: 32 watts 
The mass and power results were based on an increased factor of 2, due to the 
substantial reduction in the payload size (Apgar et al., 1999, p. 297).  
3. Operation and Support 
As discussed in an earlier chapter, the operation and support cost of a satellite 
system is approximately 30 percent of the total lifetime cost of the system. The following 
sections express the how a SBG system can reduce risk and cost for initial operation and 
expresses the benefits a sensor only platform provided to everyday operations. 
Reparability of a SBG is also explored; however current cost and risk comparison are not 
within the scope of this research. 
a. Initial Operation Capability 
Often times the initial operational capability depends upon the current 
technological maturity of the subsystems being incorporated into the satellite and ground 
support stations, as discussed in an earlier chapter. The FireSat example shows two 
specific areas that require modifications in order to obtain the best result with the lowest 
cost. These areas are the control and data management, as well as the IR interface, to 
include noise reduction. Once a cost trade-off decision is chosen, the change to any of the 
parameters will result in a large impact to cost and schedule. Additional changes, to 
include updates to technology or any other innovation that could reduce operational risk 
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to the program would also impact cost and schedule, with possible increases 
performance.  
The requirement to select a single sensor to maintain lower cost is a key element 
in the drawbacks of a monolithic system. Although selection of multiple sensors will 
result in higher cost with regard to payload design, the ability to diversify the payloads 
between satellites, therefore limiting the size and weight of each platform, may result in 
the deployment costs for multiple small satellites comparing favorably to the deployment 
of a single system. 
Additional benefits of a SBG are the separate design and production pipelines that 
can be used. Each individual element can be built independent of the others, allowing the 
communications satellite subsystem to be decoupled from system payload requirements. 
This allows for rapid development and deployment of the system. The development 
structure can be viewed as a system of systems with a larger control of the systems in 
development, allowing for limited problems of synchronization implementation. If a 
sensor platform falls behind schedule, at least a partially capable system can be deployed, 
awaiting the completion of the remaining parts. These remaining parts can join the 
deployed system at a later time (Orndorff & Zink, 2010). 
b. Operation and Reliability 
The operation of a system is dependent on each component of the system, and 
their reliability in both singular operation and successful integration with the spacecraft 
and ground stations, as required. The payload data collection processing by the onboard 
system is a large limitation to a monolithic system. An image sensor, as provided by the 
FireSat example, can allow for high data rates and large signal processing meeting the 
design capability of the sensor (Apgar et al., 1999). Often, the ability of the satellite’s 
communication or processing systems to meet the sensor’s capability limits the amount of 
data provided by the system. This requires natural tradeoffs to meet the system 
requirements, and processing to adjust the information provided from the sensor to the 
operator. 
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Payload control and data management onboard a satellite platform require 
analysis of architectural options in order to determine the best course of action with the 
lowest impact to cost. SMAD provides an example of these architectural comparisons for 
FireSat in table 16-22 on page 679 (Apgar et al., 1999). The table displays different 
processor and interface options and the resultant pros and cons of each of the four 
options. The requirements of a satellite to perform the processing of sensor data increases 
the complexity of the design, adding cost, complexity, and weight to accommodate the 
number of general processors; or reducing the reliability of the system to provide the 
requisite threshold needs in order to save cost by reduction in processing capabilities. The 
final determination, as made in SMAD, is to utilize a full Field of View sensor with two  
processors (Apgar et al., 1999). 
Utilizing an SBG design, the gathered data can be off loaded from the sensor 
platform to the communication hub, or a separate processing satellite. The utilization of a 
separate satellite for processing data allows for a reduction of power requirements of the 
sensor satellite. This reduction in power allows for a reduction in complexity of the 
satellite.  
c. Repairability 
The monolithic structure of FireSat allows for coverage and detection through the 
utilization of two satellites, placed in 90 deg offset orbits (Apgar et al., 1999). The 
highest danger to cost and operation of this type of system, as expressed by Brown and 
Eremenko, is that a loss in an element will result in a complete loss of capability; whereas 
a SBG leads to a reduction in capability as a result of the individual module that failed 
(2006b). Monolithic systems have several options in the event of a failure of a 
component, either repair or replace the component on orbit, or dispose of the current 
satellite and replace it with an operational system. The feasibility of repairing or 
replacing onboard components while in orbit is only found in a single instance in current 
spacecraft history, and that is the Hubble Space Telescope. As a result of the 
decommissioning of the shuttle fleet, there are currently no satellites or servicing 
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spacecraft in operation capable of providing reparability services to Hubble. Replacement 
of an entire satellite is the only recourse for a failed major system component that does 
not include a redundancy. 
A SBG system reduces the cost of the replacement of components, as only a 
single module is needed, vice the entire constellation. It allows for a new component to 
be placed into the wireless network, enabling the ability to replace components without 
the need for complex robotic servicing (Sahel, 2006). An imaging system, such as 
FireSat, is not restricted by the mean reliability risk of the many components necessary to 
achieve the detection of wild fires. Each component can be individually replaced in the 
event of failure. Additionally, each component can theoretically by replaced in the event 
of large technological improvements, allowing for requirements to be adjusted over the 
lifetime of the system, by just allowing deployment of additional modules (Brown & 
Eremenko, 2006a). This simple change in architecture provides a means to distribute 
schedule and operation risk, reducing overall cost of the program. 
4. Launch Segment 
The capability to deliver a space system to orbit is an additional factor that can 
greatly impact the size and weight allowed for a satellite. If unaccounted for, the launch 
system could result in major delays in a program due to redesign to match the 
requirements of the desired launch system. There are several considerations to make 
when choosing a launch vehicle; and the ability to launch several SBG segments in one 
launch is a consideration that could result in reduced program costs. 
SBG architecture allows for reduction in the size of the system, payload, and 
propulsion systems. This allows for the flexibility to select from many different launch 
vehicles (Orndorff & Zink, 2010). In modeling a SBG system, the cost impact is reduced 
because of the small size of the satellite, allowing individual modules to launch 
separately on smaller vehicles, or as add-ons to other launches. Additionally, De Weck 
states, when calculating the launch costs to achieve 99.9 percent probability of successful 
on-orbit operations, the reasonable launch cost and fractionation penalty assumption 
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result in launch costs reduction in two or more than a traditional system. This analysis 
removes the potential of a SBG system providing value if all modules do not make it to 
orbit (De Weck et al., 2004).  
Analysis and research done by the SMAD authors determined the most cost 
effective launch system would be the Pegasus  rocket. Calculations of the FireSat system 
provide approximately 225 kg of total satellite weight. Based on the Pegasus  User’s 
Guide Release 6.0, the Pegasus  launch system can deliver FireSat to the requisite orbit, 
as seen in Figure 6 (Pegasus  User’s Guide, 2007). 
 
Figure 6. Pegasus  XL without Hydrazine Auxiliary Propulsion System Performance 
Capability (from Pegasus  User’s Guide, 2007, p. 11). 
The SBG design comparison results in a reduction of total weight to 85kg. The 
separation of the communication suite from the imaging platform also reduces the size of 
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the sensor platform, allowing the analysis of placing several satellites in the Pegasus  XL 
launch system.  
5. System Communications 
The backbone of each and every space-based system is communications. This is 
no less true for nanosatellites in LEO than for military communications satellites, such as 
the Advanced Extreme High Frequency system. Communications are required to transmit 
payload information to the desired ground stations, provide Telemetry, Tracking, and 
Control (TT&C), and afford relay of information between satellites, in some cases. 
Within a monolithic construct, each satellite is comprised of the communications 
downlink as well as TT&C uplink components. This is another piece, including the 
sensor payload and the processing and storage required for that payload, which drives up 
costs. The communications requirement adds power and weight to the overall satellite 
design, and those elements grow with the complexity required of the communications 
suite. 
The following section examines the difference between the requirements of 
satellite to satellite communications and that of a ground communications link that would 
be established for a SBG.  
a. Space-Based Communications 
A benefit of a SBG is that the core communication satellite, or central hub, 
provides a dedicated, high-bandwidth ground link that is several times larger than a single 
satellite system, allowing for transmission of hundreds or more megabits (Orndorff & 
Zink, 2010). 
Operational today, there are a few examples of satellites that utilize space 
communications, relaying information from one satellite to another. These typical 
satellites convey large communications packages, often times allowing for seamless 
communications between command nodes across the world. A SBG system is fully 
dependent on space based communications, if at a smaller scale, than most global or 
 32 
planetary relay systems. Communications between systems in a SBG involves just a 
replacement of the current monolithic data bus structure, and replacing it with wireless 
data links between the individual satellites (Saleh, 2006). 
SBG architecture is fixed around a centralized communications hub, which would 
serve as the pathway for TT&C and sensor data. Each additional module is designed such 
that it could join and integrate into the hub LAN, similar to current terrestrial wireless 
networks available around the world. This enables a hub and spoke system configuration, 
allowing the communication satellite to contain the router for the LAN (Orndorff & Zink, 
2010). The network would allow for positional and health data from each spoke to be 
independently reported to the hub system. An example of this is approached in the F6 and 
the Mission-Aware Network Architecture for Small-Satellite Adaptive Systems 
(MANASSAS). These systems utilize a cognitive networking approach, giving the 
systems the ability to change and modify its behavior in flight. This allows for a 
significant enhancement in a systems effectiveness and flexibility (Waite, 2011). 
The TT&C of individual modules would be relayed through the communications 
hub. Orndorff and Zink propose that each module should contain its own capability of 
determining its location, utilizing GPS or star and horizon trackers (Orndorff & Zink, 
2010). While a GPS system is adequate for a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) system, Medium 
Earth Orbit and GEO systems would require the use of stellar locating sensors, further 
complicating the system architecture. A separate location computation could utilize 
interferometer architecture. This would require each module to report information on 
different frequencies. This would allow a single interferometer to establish the relative 
position of each module, and utilize its own location device to relay the full details of the 
constellation position to the TT&C stations. The utilization of interferometers is prevalent 
in several terrestrial systems, to include the new P-8A Poseidon aircraft, which uses 
interferometer measurements to accurately maintain current locations of sonobuoys based 
on relative location to the aircraft, and the aircraft’s geolocation (Department of the Navy 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 2014). 
 33 
The concept of SBG systems is to utilize current wireless technology to achieve 
the constellation integrated LAN. There are several different options to examine in 
determining the best system to select for this LAN. Initial studies indicate that RF 
transmissions are more favorable at distances below several hundred meters, with 
modular distance of several kilometers favoring laser transmissions. The highly favorable 
frequency bands for RF are the V or W band (Sahel, 2006). An experiment conducted 
onboard the Mir space station, designated at the Mir Wireless Network Experiment 
(MWNE) provided risk mitigation for the ISS, in proving the concept of a space based 
wireless network. The MWNE was conducted onboard the Space Shuttle mission STS-74 
and Mir. The experiment operated a 2.4 GHz wireless network at a power output of 
50mW (Lofton & Conley, 1997). This concept, although not performed for satellite to 
satellite communications, does provide the basis that a 2.4 GHz network can be 
established between systems in orbit. 
Current wireless technology allows for transmission on 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz 
frequency bands, operating with an average power output of 20 dBm. This design, 
assuming a wireless link based on current 802.11 series, weighs tens of pounds, requires 
little power, and fit into small spaces, even when including a 12 dB antenna for 
transmission (Orndorff & Zink, 2010). In this study, a wireless link of 2.4 GHz was 
utilized, as this frequency spectrum has been previously tested in spaceflight, as 
referenced in Lofton and Conley MWNE report (1997). Several wireless LAN systems 
on the market today allow for dual transmission on these frequencies. The router 
examined in this research was the Asus RT-AC68U, based on a top pick by CNET.com 
reviewers. As a top pick, the router provided a continuous 381 Mbps throughput speeds at 
a distance of 30 m, which was stated as “still very impressive” (Ngo, 2014). The 
assumption is that due to the decrease in atmospheric attenuation, the router would prove 
as capable at a 50 m distance, as compared to the 30 m in an Earth bound test. This 
router, even as a larger model, has a weight of only 26.3 oz., takes up a total of 0.00234 
m3 (Ngo, 2014).  
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b. Ground Communications 
An additional requirement of every space based system is the communications of 
data to the user, and directives to the system. The required downlink to the ground 
station, as simply described by Jerry Sellers, is information on the health and status of the 
spacecraft as well as the designed payload. This link has the largest amount of data to 
transport, and as a result, is often the limiting factor in the amount of information that can 
be collected, stored, and transmitted. When examining the varying requirements of a 
SBG, there are two primary avenues to explore in determining the architecture of the 
ground communications network. 
(1) Single Site Support 
Single site support architecture is what is primarily utilized in today’s space 
missions. The construct that information from the downlink, as well as the uplink, is 
focused under a single unit, often with various link locations throughout the country or 
world. For utilization in SBG architecture, this would form as a central network storage 
area, similar to the network cloud concept being utilized by several different companies 
today. All of the information gathered by all the satellites would be transmitted to a 
central location, with each payload being specifically encoded for cataloging in the 
network. This would require several link sites, and a large area for processing and storage 
of the data, so that users could retrieve the data as needed. This is simplistic, in that the 
basic parameters of the architecture are developed, and only the catalog and distribution 
of payload information would need specific development per program. 
(2) Mission Specific Site Supports 
A mission specific site support would be ideal for a massive SBG undertaking 
that included a mixture of civilian and DOD, or open and sensitive information. It would 
ensure that data would be downloaded to sites only designated to receive that 
information, limiting the ease of sensitive information being leaked or intercepted. The 
architecture to utilize this type of support is not as widely utilized in today’s market. It is 
further complicated within a SBG construct. A mission specific, multi-site support would 
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require the communication hub to be capable of individually transmitting data, based on a 
type of encoding or encryption, to a specific site. Due to the inevitability of having more 
than one site within the communication field of view, it would also require the ability to 
perform a downlink on different frequencies, to ensure no cross link of data flowing at 
the same time. This architecture, while beneficial, may result in an undesired cost 
increase of a program, due to these requirements. 
To allow for direct analysis, a NASA Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) 
was used as a currently operational system that could provide the functions desired of the 
communications hub for a SBG. The TDRS currently provides simultaneous relay 
between ground stations and multiple satellites (Bell, 2014). The scope of a 
communications hub would be reduced slightly, in that the satellite would only be 
required to connect to the wireless network, and not be responsible for relay to multiple 
systems within different orbits. SMAD provides, in table 20-16, as Space Systems cost 
estimate of each TDRS, which estimates an average cost of $172 million per unit (Apgar 
et al., 1999). More information on the capabilities of TDRS can be found on the NASA 
Space Communications and Navigation web site (Mai, 2013). 
Separating the sensor element from the communication suite of a single unit can 
give increased capability, but it does add additional costs to the program. The cost 
savings are realized within the combination of several sensor units, each utilizing a single 
communications hub, for data transmission and reception. The communications platform 
would add to the program cost, but the effectiveness of adding several sensors under a 
single program would result in overall cost savings.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The research completed and analyzed in this chapter shows the specific 
correlations and explicit detailed differences between a common monolithic space system 
and that of a SBG system. Each area examined is required for detailed acquisitions, and 
must be done in conjunction with all others in order to prevent delays and cancellations in 
a program. Each section provided the required inputs and resulting outputs for the FireSat 
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SBG system. All data inputs and outputs calculated for FireSat SBG Sensor Design can 
be found in Figure 7 thru Figure 14 appendix. 
The DARPA F6 project is a prime example of a program omission that resulted in 
a million dollar system being canceled, in that the program lacked an overall integrator. 
Additionally, Brad Tousley stated that the system was not focused on a traditional 
mission set, “only data transfer—there was nothing else happening” (Ferster, 2013).  
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IV. APPLICATION OF STUDY 
A. ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
The previously stated research and analysis conducted provides a breakdown of a 
monolithic imaging platform into a SBG sensor system, and the estimated cost savings of 
that single system. It shows how removing the communications component from the 
sensor platform would change the overall structure of the architecture requirements, and 
how this separation can benefit a program. The following chapter utilizes the assumption 
that the majority of systems would experience the same relative cost savings, and shows 
the estimated program savings when combining FireSat with three currently operational 
systems in orbits. The systems utilized were the Fermi Gamma-ray Space Telescope 
(FGST), Galaxy Evolution Explorer (GALEX), and Swift Gamma Ray Burst Explorer 
(SWIFT) spacecraft. These systems were selected due to their relatively close orbital and 
inclination to each other, and the assumption FireSat could operate within those 
parameters. Additionally, these sensor payloads all utilize an imaging type sensor, so a 
general relationship can be made between them. Table 4 provides basic details on each 
system. Further information can be found on the NASA National Space Science Data 
Center (Bell, 2014). An estimated payload size was determined based on a default 
assumption that the payload was approximately 26 percent of the total spacecraft weight. 
The space segment portion of the cost analysis was used, assuming the operational costs 
between a fully monolithic system and a SBG sensor would be similar, due to the mission 
being unchanged. This is a rough assumption, as the type of ground architecture utilizing 
a single point download system, as described earlier, could reduce the cost of the program 
due to the reduction in overall footprint required of the systems as a whole. Additionally, 
the launch costs were not included, as the launch platforms of the original systems was 
not researched. 
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Table 4. System Example Parameters (from Bell, 2014) 













FireSat  Example 700.0 700.0 55.0 175.0 28.1 
FGST 33053 527.9 545.9 25.6 4303 1160 
GALEX 27783 685.3 690.3 29.0 280.0 75.6 
SWIFT 28485 554.0 570.8 20.6 1470 397 
 
B. COST COMPARISONS 
This cost savings determined are primarily found in the R&D and manufacturing 
of the system architecture. The cost savings are fully realized when combining several 
systems into a single architecture system, due to the savings provided by a sensor only 
platform, when compared to the monolithic system. Additional savings include reliability 
of each module and module replacement; however those specific topics were not fully 
researched. 
The cost analysis of FireSat was compiled utilizing the data found in the 
Appendix, compared to the results provided in SMAD, specifically utilizing table 20-24 
on page 816. The $60.1 million estimate was based on the Small Satellite Cost Model 
(SSCM) provided in table 20-6. This space based cost was approximately 44 percent of 
the total estimated total cost of the system over 5 years, as provided by table 20-24 
(Apgar et al., 1999). The space segment sum of components estimated cost of the sensor 
FireSat system, as a result of the limited communications requirement, resulted in a cost 
of $23.9 million, saving just over $36 million (60 percent) as compared to the SMAD 
estimate.  
A cost analysis of the four systems, developed as only sensor platforms, and the 
addition of a TDRS type communication hub was done to fully realize the savings 
capable of SBG architecture. In order to remain within the scope of this thesis, a few 
assumptions were made toward the three operational systems. 
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• The space segment cost of each system matched FireSat, in that it was 44 
percent of the total operational cost 
• The reduction to a sensor only platform reduced the space segment cost of 
each system to 40 percent of the original space segment cost, as per the 
FireSat example. 
• The TDRS cost accurately represents the space segment cost of a 
communication hub. 
The total lifetime cost of each operational system was researched and converted 
into FY15 dollars, and was determined to be $233.2 million for FGST (SLAC National 
Acceleration Laboratory, 2007), $160.8 million for GALEX (Clark, 2012), and $317.7 
million for SWIFT (Neal, 2004). Under the assumption each system followed a similar 
cost fallout as described in earlier chapters, in that 70 percent of costs were utilized for 
acquisitions, Table 5 provides a breakdown of lifetime cost to estimated SBG Space 
Segment cost. 















FireSat  $85.86  $60.1  $23.9 
FGST  $233.2  $163  $65.3 
GALEX  $160.8  $113  $45.0 
SWIFT  $317.7  $222  $90.0 
 
Upon combining all four systems into a SBG, the expected savings is 
approximately $224 million. When combining with the TDRS, with a unit cost of $172 




This thesis presented arguments that SBG architectures could provide beneficial 
improvements that can result in reduced cost of a space system. A detailed breakdown of 
an example system combined with assumed similarities to three additional, currently 
operational systems, shows that there is a realistic cost savings to the space segment 
alone, when combining multiple systems into SBG architecture. Research also theorizes 
that SBG architecture could provide a level of flexibility without resulting in an increase 
in cost when adding additional sensors to orbit, as compared to current concepts.  
A broad analysis was done by Charlotte Mathieu (2006) in her paper assessing the 
fractionated spacecraft concept. Her conclusion was: 
Fractionated spacecraft could deliver more value to customers than 
traditional ones for a given mission and at a given level of performance. 
As demonstrated in the architectural analysis, the more fractionated the 
architecture is, the more expensive it is. But in terms of value delivered to 
potential customer the “best” fractionated architectures are different in 




This thesis researched the development of a SBG, focusing on the estimated 
advantages as well as an estimated cost savings for the space segment architecture. The 
full realization of cost savings requires further research, but initial analysis shows that 
there is a point in which cost savings will be understood with a SBG over a monolithic 
architecture. 
A. KEY POINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The thesis attempted to answer two questions. 
• Can the SBG architecture reduce cost of space systems? 
Research and analysis of FireSat, as provided by formulas in SMAD, shows that 
approximately 60 percent of savings per system can be gained. When combining several 
systems together, this cost will offset a requirement to have a centralized communication 
hub for SBG architecture. 
• Could a SBG allow mission flexibility without substantial cost increases? 
Research provides examples of how the flexibility SBG could provide throughout 
a system’s lifecycle can save millions of dollars in expenses. This savings is difficult to 
fully capture, as it is dependent of the specifics of each architecture, however a safe 
hypothesis is that the added flexibility provide will not increase cost, and may prove to 
decrease the costs over a system’s lifetime. 
The SBG architecture shows promise in having the capability to provide the DOD 
with cost effective space systems, and could result in a whole new paradigm. Research 
done by Ms. Mathieu (2006) shows that private sector organizations have little incentive 
to move toward a fractionated architecture, but the government has the best position to 
enable this\ transition to SBG systems. This requires focused research and contracting in 
order to ensure mission capability and integration is captured. The DARPA F6 project is 
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a casualty of this lack of focus, and will result in further delay in acceptance of SBG 
architectures for future implementation. 
B. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research presented in this thesis took a defined separation of a sensor 
platform and the communication suite, and adding three similar systems to the 
architecture to realize an estimated cost savings to the space segments of these 
architectures. Further research and analysis should be done to attempt to capture cost 
savings in relation to communications and operations of SBG, as well as risk-cost 
comparisons that a SBG provides. The risk-cost comparison includes further system 
fractionation, reliability benefits with SBG elements, and mission complexity 
requirements as a result of fractionated systems. In specifics to reliability, Brown and 
Eremenko express the benefit in the quote: 
If treated as a design parameter endogenous to the design process, the 
reliability of each module can be independently set to maximize the net 
value delivered by the system in light of considerations such as: the 
different paces of obsolescence for different technologies may make the 
early replacement of some modules (most notably C&DH) desirable; the 
cost of implementing a given degree of reliability may be starkly different 
across modules; and the degree to which the health of a particular module 
is vital to the capability of the overall system (i.e., its covariance with the 
other modules) may differ depending on the system architecture, degree of 
homogeneous fractionation, and the types of connectivity. (2006. p. 10) 
Additionally, technological advances over extended life mission should be 
considered, as obsolescence does not threaten the entire system, just the single portion 
that platform is placed (Orndorff & Zink, 2010).  
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APPENDIX:  FIRESAT SBG SENSOR DESIGN 
 
Figure 7. Orbital Inputs 
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Figure 8. Optics Payload Information 
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Figure 9. Payload Physical Sizing 
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Figure 10. Uplink Communications Inputs 
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Figure 11. Downlink Communications Input 
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Figure 12. Final Design Sizing Input 
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Figure 13. Cost Estimate Inputs 
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